ABSTRACT Task matching in crowdsourcing is designed to provide convenient task information retrieval and has been extensively explored. In general, the task matching process is required to be reliable and to meet privacy requirements. However, most existing privacy-preserving task matching solutions for crowdsourcing focus on privacy issues but ignore the reliability of the process. In this paper, we propose a blockchainbased task matching scheme for crowdsourcing with a secure and reliable matching. Instead of utilizing a centralized cloud server, we employ smart contracts, an emerging blockchain technology, to provide reliable and transparent matching. In this way, data confidentiality and identity anonymity are achieved effectively and efficiently. The extensive privacy analysis and performance evaluation show that our solution is secure and feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing [1] has emerged as an efficient task distribution mechanism, which is usually used to execute high complexity or wide coverage tasks, such as large scale translation, specific information collection and high-resolution image acquisition. Over the past few years, there have been many crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical MTurk 1 and CrowdFlower 2 . In these platforms, task matching service is especially important when retrieving a large and growing number of tasks. The efficiency and quality of task matching services can not only influence the enthusiasm of participants, but also be an important factor judging the availability of a crowdsourcing platform.
Task matching in crowdsourcing has caught the attention of many researchers. In current research, schemes [2] , [3] , [4] focus on the association between workers and tasks in task matching. The process of establishing associations often involves task requirements and workers' preferences, while requirements and preferences are sensitive information.
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These sensitive information may be exposed due to the unreliability and vulnerability of crowdsourcing platforms. Recently, many researches on privacy-preserving crowdsourcing platform have emerged, and most of them focus only on the privacy of workers, e.g., identity [5] , location [6] , and preference [7] . However, the content of tasks and queries can also reveal the sensitive information of workers and requesters. Specifically, the crowdsourcing platform can infer the identity and preferences of workers by combining queries and task requirements, which means that malicious platforms may disclose the sensitive data in order to earn extra profits. Thus, the crowdsourcing platform is required to protect the privacy of tasks and workers during task matching.
In order to protect privacy, tasks are usually encrypted before being submitted to the platform. Searchable encryption (SE) seems to provide a good solution to match encrypted tasks in crowdsourcing. Most of SE schemes, such as [8] , [9] , only support individual data owners to make their own queries. However, a large number of requesters and workers simultaneously exist in crowdsourcing. Intuitively, a single-user SE scheme cannot be directly applied to task matching in crowdsourcing. There are some extended SE schemes [10] , [11] , [12] based on proxy re-encryption technology, which can be applied to crowdsourcing scenarios with multiple workers or multiple requesters. In the proxy-based scheme, the relationship between workers and re-encryption keys is inevitably determined. Since a query from workers is required to be re-encrypted on the platform, a malicious platform may learn the identity information of workers and requesters by analyzing the association between re-encryption keys and search history. After the identity information is obtained by the malicious platform, the information may be sold to a third party, resulting in a wider disclosure. Therefore, it is necessary to achieve the identity anonymity in crowdsourcing.
When using searchable encryption to construct a matching scheme, the designer needs to make some assumptions about the crowdsourcing platform. Most SE solutions consider the platform to be honest-but-curious or even trusted. However, there may be some dishonest behavior on the platform in the task matching service in crowdsourcing. In particular, when a worker submits a query, malicious platforms may not perform operations or provide incorrect results in order to save computation cost. The incorrect results reduce the availability of platforms and affect the enthusiasm of workers. Scheme [11] has the ability to validate the matching results but requires additional computations at the worker side, which greatly reduces the service efficiency. Consequently, how to ensure the reliable matching of crowdsourcing platforms is a very challenging issue. It is desirable to a task matching scheme providing privacy-preserving and reliable matching.
In this paper, we design a blockchain-based privacypreserving task matching scheme for crowdsourcing, called BPTM, which focuses on three issues: (1) privacypreserving task matching, where workers' preferences and task requirements are well protected; (2) identity anonymity, where the identity information of workers and requesters will not be revealed during task matching; (3) reliable matching, where the returned tasks are corresponding to the worker's preferences.
Considering the centralized crowdsourcing platform is vulnerable to internal or external attacks and may maliciously modify the matching results, using traditional centralized platforms for task matching cannot address these potential issues. In BPTM, we apply the Ethereum blockchain to build an autonomous, accurate decentralized platform, which can be used to replace the potentially dishonest and vulnerable platform. To achieve the privacy-preserving task matching, we construct a searchable encryption scheme to protect task requirements and workers' preferences. Then we use the blockchain-based platform to store the encrypted index in order to provide matching services. By combining smart contracts with searchable encryption, identity anonymity and reliable matching can be effectively achieved. Moreover, we demonstrate that BPTM is secure and feasible through privacy analysis and performance evaluation. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• This paper systematically analyzes the privacy and utility of task matching in crowdsourcing and also defines a set of privacy and utility requirements.
• Compared with the proxy-based or blockchain-based solutions, the BPTM provides identity anonymity to further protect privacy in crowdsourcing.
• Compared with the solutions that rely on the centralized platform, the BPTM achieves reliable task matching and prevents malicious behavior from the adversary. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work and Section III provides the preliminaries. In Section IV, we formulate the problem of task matching in crowdsourcing with the system model, threat model and design goals. In Section V, we describe the detailed construction of BPTM and also analyze its security. In Section VI, we implement the BPTM and make a detailed performance analysis in comparison with the related work theoretically and experimentally. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
There are two topics related to our research: task matching in crowdsourcing and searchable encryption. They are discussed separately below.
A. TASK MATCHING IN CROWDSOURCING
With the growing development and popularity of crowdsourcing, many researches on task matching have emerged. Task matching in crowdsourcing usually establishes the association between workers and tasks through interest [2] , location [13] , or reputation [14] . Considering the security and privacy issues for crowdsourcing, some studies have focused on protecting the privacy of workers, such as [5] based on k-anonymity, [6] based on differential privacy, [7] based on homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, schemes [15] , [16] based on searchable encryption can simultaneously protect the characteristics of workers and the requirements of tasks, which meet the privacy requirements of task matching. However, all these schemes rely on an honest-but-curious crowdsourcing platform ignoring the malicious behavior from the platform. In fact, crowdsourcing platforms may not be honest, where malicious platforms can modify matching results for additional benefits [18] . Specifically, although the privacy of workers and tasks is protected, the malicious crowdsourcing platform can modify the matching results through the identity information of workers and requesters. The incorrect results hinder further development of crowdsourcing. Therefore, the existing solutions cannot guarantee the correctness of the matching results due to the potential threat of centralized platforms.
B. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable encryption supports us to implement a secure matching scheme, enabling workers to retrieve the corresponding encrypted tasks. Song et al. [21] first proposed a symmetric searchable encryption mechanism. Boneh et al. [22] proposed the first searchable encryption scheme for the public setting. Since the popularity of cloud storage systems, a lot of schemes have been put forward according to actual needs, including fuzzy keyword search [23] , ranked search [24] and multi-keyword search [25] . However, all these schemes only support queries from data owners, which is not suitable for encrypted data matching in the multiple participant setting. In order to construct a multi-owner and multi-user model, [26] and [19] utilize broadcast encryption to generate distinct keys to each worker based on the public master key, enabling workers to query encrypted data. However, the broadcast encryption scheme cannot provide convenient worker registration and revocation. Once the worker needs to be added or revoked, the broadcast encryption scheme is required to be re-initialized. Alternatively, Dong et al. [11] , Bao et al. [10] and Shu et al. [15] achieve the multi-user setting by using proxy re-encryption. In proxy-based schemes, the proxy server needs to re-encrypt the information of requesters or workers with the corresponding re-key, which means that the proxy server may infer the identity by analyzing the retrieval behavior.
With the emergence of blockchain technology, some scholars have tried to combine blockchain technology with the searchable encryption. Different from the previous searchable encryption scheme based on a centralized cloud storage platform, blockchain-based searchable encryption ensures data owners control their data against the honest-but-curious platforms. Li et al. [20] proposed the first searchable encryption scheme based on Bitcoin system. In their setting, the encrypted data and encrypted indexes are split and stored at a set of bitcoin transactions. However, as the amount of data grows, the blockchain needs to maintain a large number of transactions, which has a high overhead but low efficiency. Cai et al. [18] combines an efficient dynamic searchable encryption scheme with blockchain, and establishes a trustworthy keyword search scheme in decentralized storage. Although this scheme improves the efficiency of the system, it only supports single data owner to manage the data. Do and Ng [28] and Peng et al. [29] focus on the implementation of distributed data storage, trying to use smart contract to manipulate and authorize data. In these distributed storage schemes, search permissions depend on the search authorization from data owners, which is not applicable to public task matching in crowdsourcing. By leveraging the smart contract in Ethereum, Hu et al. [30] propose a decentralized privacy-preserving search scheme to build up a fair data purchase service, but their construction only supports upload by a single data owner. In addition, the purchase record of workers will be recorded on the blockchain, which may result in the disclosure of identity information. Besides the above conventional blockchain-based SE schemes, other schemes of combining blockchains have been studied, such as attribute-based matching [31] and authentication-based matching [32] , [33] . However, these schemes cannot meet the needs of task matching in terms of scalability and efficiency in crowdsourcing.
This paper intends to achieve utility and security goals as shown in Table 1 . The above existing schemes cannot fully possess these features, so they cannot be directly applied to the task matching in crowdsourcing.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some background knowledge before going to the details of our construction. All the notations in the following description can be referred in Table 2 .
A. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND ETHEREUM

1) BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain is the core supporting technology of Bitcoin [34] Ethereum [35] and other cryptocurrency system. The essence of the blockchain is a public distributed ledger that allows anyone to participate in. In this way, the failure of a VOLUME 7, 2019 blockchain node does not affect other nodes. The consensus mechanism between blockchain nodes maintains the entire blockchain network, which allows each blockchain node to obtain a complete copy of the database. Therefore, blockchain system can only be modified in accordance with strict rules and consensus.
Blocks and transactions are the main components of the blockchain network. Each block stores transaction information in a certain organization. Each transaction records a specific set of operations. The cryptographic hash algorithm and the merkle tree [36] structure ensure that the data cannot be tampered.
2) ETHEREUM
Smart Contract, first proposed by Nick [37] in 1995, is a computer program that can be executed automatically according to its contents. Ethereum is a programming platform that enables developers to build distributed applications based on smart contracts. Specifically, Ethereum can be used for protocol programming, behavioral assurance and trading, such as voting, financial transactions, company management, and signing agreements. Compared to the Bitcoin system, Ethereum has an innovative feature that enables programs to be executed on the blockchain. Once the smart contract is deployed, it can execute the contract without relying on any central authority. Ideally, the smart contract runs exactly as programmed, so the results are accurate and verifiable. We briefly describe the basic principles of smart contracts, as shown in Fig. 1 . The complete smart contract is stored in a block. When deploying the smart contract, it is necessary to preset the trigger condition and the corresponding response rule. The relevant status and values are recorded in the deployed smart contract. Each action from the calling node will be executed. Only the actions that modify the states or values of the contract will eventually be recorded in the blockchain and other actions will not be disclosed.
B. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable encryption is an effective way to achieve matching of encrypted data. A SE scheme mainly contains three entities: data owner, data user and the matching server. The entire definition of SE model can be defined as a tuple SE = (Setup, Encrypt, Match, Decrypt), shown as follows:
It is a probabilistic algorithm that is run by the data owner to setup the service. It takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a secret key K .
•
It is a probabilistic algorithm that is run by the data owner to encrypt tasks. It takes a task description D, a keyword w and the secret key K as input, and outputs a keyword ciphertext I w and the encrypt tasks CT .
• CT ← Match(K , I w , w ). It is a deterministic algorithm that is run by the server or the data user U . It takes the secret key K , query keyword w as input, and computes the trapdoor T w . Then, it takes the trapdoor T w as input, matches I w with calculations, and outputs CT .
It is a deterministic algorithm that is run by the user U . It takes secret key K and the encrypt tasks CT as input, and outputs the original task description D . An SE scheme is effective if for all
C. BILINEAR PAIRINGS G 1 , G 2 and G T are all multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g i denotes a generator of G i . A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T has the following properties:
• Bilinearity:
• Non-degeneracy: e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
• Computability: it is efficient to compute e for any input. This article will use the following assumption for bilinear pairing:
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Variant (BDHV) assumption. The BDHV problem is stated as follows:
are chosen randomly. We say that the BDHV assumption holds if all probabilistic polynomial time machine have a negligible advantage to distinguish.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
In our work, we consider a blockchain-based crowdsourcing system that uses smart contracts instead of untrusted servers for task matching calculations. Task requesters upload encrypted tasks by interacting with smart contracts so that only authorized workers can match tasks through their interests. For a matching request, the smart contract will return the corresponding matching results based on the established logic and the input from workers. Based on the consensus, the Ethereum network guarantees that the status of the contract and the returned results are not tampered with, thus achieving the reliability of task matching.
FIGURE 2. System model of our scheme.
As shown in Fig. 2 , there are four entities in the crowdsourcing system: a key manager (KM), an Ethereum platform, multiple task requesters and multiple workers. The KM performs system initialization and provides registration for requesters and workers. Initially, KM generates the system parameters and deploys smart contracts on the Ethereum platform. After obtaining the secret key, the task requester interacts with the smart contract to upload the encrypted index. In order to retrieve the related tasks, the workers register on KM to obtain trapdoors that meet their characteristics. When receiving the retrieval request, the Ethereum platform authenticates the worker address and returns the relevant tasks through matching calculations. Note that this paper is not concerned with the storage problem. Encrypted task content can be stored in the cloud or any distributed storage as long as the pointer to the task content is recorded in the smart contract.
B. THREAT MODEL
In this work, KM performs registration and key delivery but does not store any task information. Thus, the KM is considered completely trusted and the interaction with KM requires a secure channel. Both the requesters and the workers are considered honest in this scenario. It means that the requesters and the workers would not reveal their secret information, including their secret keys, trapdoors, identities.
Ethereum is an open platform, so the encrypted task index stored on the platform is open to all. A blockchain node is curious to obtain the additional information from the encrypted index and trapdoors. Besides, the identity information and query records are also very sensitive. The adversary can launch linking attacks to establish a link between query records and the identities. If the linking attacks are successful, the adversary can easily determine the identity of workers by analyzing query records and some external knowledge. Moreover, a malicious node could be compromised by the other entity and then return incorrect results to the workers [38] . Similar to the existing blockchain-based crowdsourcing applications, such as [39] , our structure relies on Proof-of-Work (PoW) security, where no entity in the system can gather more than 50% of the processing power [40] .
C. DESIGN GOALS
According to the above model, the design goals of our system are as follows:
• Privacy-preservation. This property requires that the BPTM should protect the privacy of workers and tasks, which means that it is impossible for a malicious node to obtain secret key and task information through the encrypted data during matching.
• Anonymity. Anonymity protects the identity information of workers and requesters, and is required by most crowdsourcing platforms. Specifically, for a query from a worker, the identity information cannot be determined; for a task submission from a requester, no one node can establish the relationship between the task and the requestor.
• Soundness. This property is to ensure that the service provider cannot deviate from the protocol. In general, the existing work achieves this goal through a series of validations. In this paper, we extend this notion to claim that the corresponding search result is reliable, and the service provider cannot forge or return partial results. Also, the correct result can be verified by most nodes in the blockchain. In addition, considering the use of SE to crowdsourcing, the following properties should be achieved.
• Efficiency. The computational overhead should be low enough to ensure that the smart contract is able to provide matching services. Specifically, the computational cost of the matching function cannot exceed the gas limit, and the time overhead should be acceptable.
• No Proxy. A proxy-based SE scheme may reveal identity privacy. Moreover, the vulnerability of the proxy and interaction costs result in proxy-based solutions that are not suitable for task matching.
V. OUR PROPOSED BPTM SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the overview of BPTM, describe the construction in detail and discuss the security properties.
A. OVERVIEW
In BPTM, we applied the Ethereum blockchain to build an autonomous, accurate decentralized platform. Specifically, the blockchain platform is responsible for the release of crowdsourcing tasks and supports matching calculations for legitimate workers. However, there are some security risks associated with using the open Ethereum platform to implement user management [41] . To solve this dilemma, VOLUME 7, 2019 BPTM uses a trusted key manager (KM) to distribute keys and grant permissions. In this way, the blockchain platform is focused on providing non-tamperable storage and verifiable task matching. To achieve the privacy-preserving task matching, we construct a searchable encryption scheme to protect task requirements and workers' preferences. Since there are multiple task requesters, we exploit session keys for each task to achieve confidentiality. Furthermore, our keyword search in the smart contract is based on the structure of the inverted index to achieve less computational overhead. To protect the identity information, the worker retrieves the task by calling the read-only function of the blockchain, which indicates that the query and results will not be revealed. Therefore, the adversary cannot link to the specific worker by analyzing the query requests. On the other hand, the task requester can upload the task through an one-task-only blockchain address to prevent the adversary from linking the identity information. By combining smart contracts with searchable encryption, identity anonymity and accurate matching can be effectively achieved.
B. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION
The BPTM consists of four phases: Service-Setup, Encrypt, Match and Decrypt. The detailed BPTM is described below. 1) Service-Setup: This phase is run by the KM to bootstrap task matching services. Given the security parameter λ, the KM consider two bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p with a mapping e : G × G → G T . Let g be a random generator of group G together with two hash functions
Then KM defines a pseudorandom function
(Enc, Dec) are the encryption and decryption algorithms of a deterministic symmetric encryption scheme(e.g. AES scheme). The KM randomly selects s ∈ Z p as its secret key.
For each task requester, KM random select rk R ←− {0, 1} λ and computes tk = g s/rk , then return rsk = (rk, tk) to the task requester.
In order to ensure the security of the system, the KM does not provide secret key to registered workers directly. The trapdoor is generated by KM according to the interests of worker in registration. In worker registration, the worker provides a keyword set W = {w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n } to represent his/her interests and provides his/her own Ethereum account address for searching. For each keyword w, the KM computes wk = H (w) s and returns to worker. Finally, KM adds the worker account address to the authorized set on the smart contract.
2) Encrypt: When a task requester R is willing to submit a task for some purpose, such as software development, copywriting or engineering design, R generates a specific crowdsourcing T = {D, t r }, indicating the description and the requirement, respectively. R first chooses a random session
where Enc(K s , D) denotes using AES algorithm to encrypt D, the encryption key is K s . Then, R uploads the ciphertext CT to cloud or other distributed storage(e.g. IPFS 3 ) and records the task location l. After that, R calculates a temporary key (H (t r ), tk) rk ).
R encrypts t r by randomly picking a r ∈ Z p and a session key
Finally, R stores the encrypted index (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) to smart contract.
3) Match: Upon receiving WK = {wk 1 , wk 2 , ...wk n } from KM, the worker U first chooses an encrypted keyword wk ∈ WK to match. Then, U calculates a temporary key
K ut = G(e(wk, g)).
Then, the worker U computes the search trapdoor
and invokes smart contract with t as arguments. After U generates and submits the trapdoor, the smart contract first judges whether U is an authorized worker. For a search request from the authorized worker, the smart contract will return the search result according to the trapdoor t res = (C 2 , C 3 ).
For other illegal search requests, the smart contract will reject the search. 4) Decrypt: Upon receiving res = (C 2 , C 3 ) from the smart contract, the worker U first computes
Then, the worker U downloads the encrypted task CT from l and computes
where Dec(K s , CT ) denotes using AES algorithm to decrypt CT , the decryption key is K s . Finally U can recovery original task description t d .
We assume that a keyword is w, t is the worker search key corresponding to w generated by KM, an encrypted index C containing the keyword q and the results results returned by the smart contract. We give the proof of the matching correctness and decryption correctness as follows:
Theorem 1 (Matching Correctness): The task matching service is correct. That is, c ∈ results if w = q.
Proof: Suppose w = q and H is a hash function, we have
Since G is a hash function, we have
Since F is a pseudo-random function, we have
That is, Matching(C, t) = 1. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 (Decryption Correctness): Only authorized workers have the ability to decrypt ciphertexts and get the correct task description. That is, tasks with a requirement w can only be decrypted by a worker who contains the corresponding search permission wt.
Proof: Suppose the worker has received the ciphertexts C 2 , C 3 . If the d = G(e(wk, C 3 )) calculated by the worker is the same as the G(e(H (w) r , tk) rk ), the worker has the ability to decrypt the task. Then we have
Since H is a hash function, we have w = w. This completes the proof.
C. CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
In this section we mainly introduce the design and deployment of the smart contract. We use Ethereum as the execution platform for the smart contract. In our construction, smart contract is programmed and developed by solidity language 4 . Specifically, the matching contract used in this paper includes five interfaces (addWorker, removeWorker, addIndex, removeIndex, taskMatching). Also, we use a special variables msg.sender from the global namespace, which represents the sender of a message or transaction.
The matching contract deployment is part of the ServiceSetup and is deployed by KM. The initialization process defines some variables required for the contract.
1) The contractOwner variable of address types, which defines the address of the KM.
2) The workerList variable of the mapping types, which defines a collection from address to a bool value, showing the search permission of workers. The KM can add or modify 4 http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest workerlist[oldWorkerAddress] = false; 8: return true; 9: end if the collection through the relevant function interfaces of the contract.
3) The searchIndex variable of the mapping types, which defines a collection from the encrypted keyword indexes to a structure Index list. This collection is used to store encrypted tasks from task requesters. The encrypted keyword index is stored as a bytes type. The structure Index contains three variables as follows:
The requesterAddr variable of address types, which defines the address of the requester.
The ciphertext variable of a bytes types, which defines the encrypted tasks.
The tmp variable of the bytes types. And the value of this variable is used to decrypt the ciphertext.
In addition, the matching contract mainly provides the following five function interfaces:
• addWorker(newWorkerAddress). This interface is only allowed to be called by the contract's creator(KM). After the worker completes registration at KM, the KM updates the workerList variable by calling algorithm 1 to provide permission.
• removeWorker(oldWorkerAddress). Corresponding to addWorker, this removeWorker interface can only be executed by the contract's creator (KM). When the system needs to delete a worker, the KM uses this function to remove worker from the authorized set. The specific operation is as shown in algorithm 2. • addIndex(keywordIndex, encryptedTask, tmpParameter). The task requester can upload the encrypted task through this interface. For a specific task, only his owner can modify and delete it. According to the construction described above, when a requester wants to publish a task, he selects the keywords from the task and builds the corresponding encrypted index (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) represents the input keywordIndex, encryptedTask and tmpParameter, respectively. Taking as input the requester address and encrypted index, the matching contract performs as Algorithm 3 to store the task information.
• removeIndex(keywordIndex, tmpParameter). This interface is open to the task owner. When the task has been completed or canceled, the task requester can delete the encrypted index by uploading keywordIndex and tmpParameter to the smart contract. The smart contract performs Algorithm 4 to delete the task.
• taskMatching(trapdoor). This interface can be called by any authorized worker. According to the construction described above, when a worker wants to retrieve the related tasks, he computes the search trapdoor 8: get res length len; 9: for i ∈ [1, len] do 10: add res [i] .ciphertext to results; 11: add res [i] .tmp to tmpParameters; 12: end for 13 : end for 14: return list results and list tmpParameters; set represents the input trapdoors. Then, the worker uploads the trapdoors to this interface for task retrieval. Taking as input the worker address and the search trapdoors, the matching contract performs as Algorithm 5 to returns the matching results. The four interfaces (addWorker, removeWorker, addIndex, removeIndex) mentioned above will change the state of the smart contract, which means that the process consumes the property of the caller's account. Since the requester uploads the task based on a one-task-only blockchain address, the addIndex interface does not verify the address. The taskMatching interface is identified by the keyword view, indicating that this process does not change the state. Interfaces that do not change state will not incur any cost and will not be recorded on the blockchain.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As defined by the privacy requirements in Section IV, the proposed scheme achieves Privacy-preservation, Anonymity and Soundness as follows:
Privacy-Preservation: Based on the security definitions proposed in [30] , if F is a pseudorandom function and G is a collision resistant hash function, then our matching construction has the same security as [30] . Furthermore, our decrypt construction can be proven secure in the random oracle model under variants of the BDHV assumptions. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish the difference between two arbitrary encrypted indexes. This means that the secret key and task information will not be revealed even though the index is public. In addition, the matching process is performed by the static interface that does not change the blockchain state. In this way, the search process and the results are not stored publicly on the blockchain, which avoids the passive attacks. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides the security of encrypted indexes and protects the privacy during the task matching.
Anonymity: Anonymity requires that the privacy information of workers and requesters cannot be explored by linking their behavior [42] . Workers' anonymity represents the query unlinkability between retrieval and worker identity. Similarly, requesters' anonymity can be understood as the submission unlinkability between task submission and identity information. For our construction, worker identity information is replaced by a random blockchain address and the retrieval operation is performed on a trusted node (e.g. local node); requester identity information is also replaced by an address, but task submission will be recorded on the blockchain because the status of the smart contract has changed. To obtain the identity information, an adversary can associate the blockchain address with a worker/requester, or link to a specific worker/requester by the authentication information. Because the workers do not reveal any interaction, an adversary can neither detect the retrieval behavior nor link to a specific worker, even though he corrupts an registered task requester and owns all the information on the blockchain platforms. Since the encrypted indexes is independent of the blockchain address, each task requester can interact with a new randomly blockchain address. And because the identity address is random and the encrypted tasks is indistinguishable, the adversary cannot establish a link between the task and the requester.
Soundness: Generally, the correct results depend on an honest service provider. In our scheme, the matching process is achieved through the smart contract on Ethereum. As long as the security of Ethereum is guaranteed, our scheme can achieve soundness. This is because smart contracts perform calculations based on the current state and response logic on Ethereum. And each miner in Ethereum uses the proof of work (POW) algorithms to achieve consensus, which means that illegally modifying the state in the smart contract requires over half resources of the entire network. Therefore, the proposed scheme with the correct state and execution logic will provide the correct matching for authorized workers.
Extension: Compared with the previous blockchain-based solutions that only support simple search, e.g., the singlesetting or single-keyword matching, our proposed scheme has a good extensibility. By constructing smart contracts, our solutions support effective worker revocation and can be adapted to provide various matching services by combining existing SE solutions. For example, the BPTM can integrate fuzzy matching [25] , pattern matching [43] and ranked search [24] to support more plentiful functions. In general, task matching in crowdsourcing is required to have extensibility in order to meet the increasingly diverse matching needs of workers.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we implemented the proposed BPTM scheme to evaluate performance, and compare it to two related schemes (SEMEKS [19] and pMatch [16] ).
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
In this section, we implemented a prototype to evaluate the practical performance of BPTM. Since BPTM combines blockchain and searchable encryption, we use two different implementation environments for different entities:
• Ethereum platform: We implement it on the Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine with a single core at 2.93GHZ and 2GB RAM in solidity with Ethereum. Then, we deployed the smart contract on the Ethereum official test network Rinkeby for storing encrypted indexes and matching. When we conducted the experiment, the gasPrice was set to 2Gwei, where 1Gwei = 10 9 wei = 10 −9 ether. At the time of writing this paper, the exchange rate between ether and the USD is 1 ether = 250 USD.
• KM, requester and worker: These three entities mainly perform the calculation and transmission of searchable encryption. We implement it on the Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine with a single at 3.6GHZ and 4GB RAM in Python 3.4 with the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library with version 0.5.14. In the comparison of searchable encryption program, we realize SEMEKS, pMatch and the part of PBTM based on SS512(|G| = 512 bits, |G T | = 1024 bits), which is a symmetric elliptic curve with base field 512-bit and embedding degree 2. The hash function H is the function in PBC library, the hash function G and the pseudorandom function F are based on SHA256. Table 1 lists the major differences of our BPTM from the comparison schemes in terms of utility and security. Compared with the previous multi-user searchable encryption schemes (MSDE and MuED), BPTM supports identity anonymity to meet privacy needs in crowdsourcing. Compared with the crowdsourcing solution requiring an honest service platform (PPTR and pMatch), PBTM supports privacy-preservation while matching correctness is guaranteed by the smart contract. Compared with some blockchainbased scheme (BC-SE and TPSE), BPTM focuses on functional requirements in crowdsourcing scenarios such as multi-owner setting, revocable setting. Meanwhile, we analyze each algorithm in three different schemes in terms of computation complexity in Table 3 . In our scheme, the time complexity of the matching algorithm is O(1), so in Table 3 , we analyze the complexity of matching and decryption together. Next, we perform a detailed performance evaluation for each entity as follows.
B. EVALUATION RESULT
1) ETHEREUM PLATFORM
The costs on the Ethereum platform in BPTM are mainly from the smart contract. The gas overhead results of the smart contracts measured by experiments are as follows. In Table 4 , the gas costs of contract create, addWorker and VOLUME 7, 2019 removeWorker of the smart contract are listed, and the cost of performing these interfaces is almost unchanged. The matching contract creates interface is only executed once by KM to complete the initialization and the costs are $0.478. The addWorker interface is executed by KM when the worker completes the registration; The removeWorker interface is required when KM needs to remove a worker from the authorization set. The cost of these two interfaces being called is $0.029 and $0.007. Then, we built the encrypted indexes for five different numbers of tasks 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20, respectively. Table 5 shows the gas overhead required for addIndex and delIndex under different number of tasks. As the number of tasks increases, the cost of these three interfaces being called increases accordingly. Specifically, the gas overhead of addIndex increases linearly with the number of tasks, and the cost of adding five encrypted indexes is approximately $0.536. When performing the delIndex cost evaluation, we delete the encrypted index in the corresponding keyword. According to calculations, the cost of deleting 5 encrypted indexes is approximately $0.041. Although calling the matching interface does not incur a fee, we also evaluate the gas cost for different number of matching operations to assess the speed of task matching. Since the data structure used by the taskMatching interface is a hash table and the calculation of the index is adjusted by G or F, the cost of the correct search is similar. As shown in the table, it takes 300,000 gas to search 5 times correctly. In our experimental environment, the execution time of a 300000 gas operation is no more than 1 second, so the matching process time is acceptable. 
2) KM
In the system initialization, the KM set up the system through the Service-Setup. As analyzed in Table 3 , the overall time cost of system initialization in BPTM is linear with the number of participants and the computation complexity of secret key generation is W · (H + E) for each worker, E for each requester. First, we vary the different number of workers (n) from 1,000 to 10,000 to measure the computation cost of secret key generation for both schemes, as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Our BPTM slightly outperforms pMatch and far outperforms SEMEKS. For example, when n = 10, 000, it takes about 85s for BPTM while SEMEKS requires 450s. Then, we additionally calculate the computational cost of BPTM under different task requesters 100, 500, 1000 respectively. In the crowdsourcing platform, the number of task requesters is generally smaller than the number of workers, so setting the 1000 task requesters can meet the needs of most crowdsourcing platforms. We observe that in the BPTM under different requesters, as the number of task requesters becomes higher, the corresponding time consumption is also slightly higher, as shown in Fig. 3(b) . For the most expensive BPTM-r1000, it takes about 90 seconds to set up a system of 10,000 workers, which is a one-time cost and acceptable for KM. 
3) REQUESTER
The overhead on each requester mainly includes the computation and transmission costs in the phase of Encrypt. The computation complexity of keyword encryption in BPTM is (H + F + P + 2G + 2E + Enc), which is slightly less than (5E +H ) for pMatch and less than 9E for SEMEKS, as shown in Table 3 . In Fig. 4(a) , we vary the different number of keywords (k) in the task requirement to compare the efficiency and find that BPTM is more efficient. We additionally carry out the transmission overhead of interacting with the smart contract. We vary the different number of encrypted indexes from 1 to 20 to calculate the overhead and find that the transmission overhead is proportional to the gas consumption of the smart contract. As illustrated in Fig.4(b) , the overhead of uploading 20 ciphertexts to smart contracts is about 5.5kb, and the corresponding cost of smart contracts is $1.7755.
4) WORKER
The overhead on each worker mainly includes the computation cost in the phase of Matching and Decrypt. Since the trapdoor generation is based on the worker interest and is only executed once, the trapdoor generation time is negligible. In this process, pMatch and SEMEKS have a cloud server entity to assist the calculation, but we don't have this entity, so our comparison combines the process of matching and decryption. Table 3 shows the computational cost of BPTM is (P + G + Dec), pMatch is (4E + H + 4P), and SEKEE is (12E + 5P). Fig. 5 shows that the total time for different number of ciphertexts in BPTM is more efficient than that in pMatch and SEMEKS. For example, it only takes about 1.2s to match and decrypt 10 ciphertexts in BPTM while it takes almost 0.3s in pMatch, almost 0.5s in SEMEKS.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the privacy and utility issues in task matching for crowdsourcing and proposed the BPTM scheme that supports multiple requesters and multiple workers by combining Ethereum blockchain and searchable encryption technology. In BPTM, we exploited the smart contract on the Ethereum to achieve task matching, ensuring that the service provider cannot deviate from the protocol. We also designed a privacy-preserving matching protocol to establish the association between workers and tasks, where the interests of workers and the requirements of tasks are well protected. Compared with the existing privacy-preserving solutions, the BPTM further protects privacy by achieving identity anonymity. Finally, we analyzed the performance of the proposed scheme from both theoretical and experimental aspects. The detailed performance evaluation demonstrates the rationality and feasibility of our proposed scheme for the practical use. 
